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This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning relationships among risk
taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between
bank managers and owners over risk, and show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative
power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show
that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions
on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of
the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings have
important policy implications as they imply that the same regulation will have different effects on















In this paper, we analyze relationships among risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, 
and national bank regulations. We focus on the potential conflicts between bank managers and 
owners over risk, and assess whether bank risk taking varies with the comparative power of 
shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we examine whether 
the relation between national regulations and bank risk depends on each bank’s ownership structure.  
Policy considerations motivate this research. As emphasized by Bernanke (1983), Calomiris 
and Mason (1997, 2003a, b), Keeley (1990), and recent financial turmoil, the risk taking behavior of 
banks affects financial and economic fragility. In turn, international and national agencies propose an 
array of regulations to shape bank risk. Yet, researchers have not assessed how standard corporate 
governance mechanisms, such as ownership structure, interact with national regulations in shaping 
the risk taking behavior of individual banks. This gap is surprising because standard agency theories 
suggest that ownership structure influences corporate risk taking (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; John, 
Litov, and Yeung, 2008). This gap is also potentially serious from a policy perspective: The same 
regulations may have different effects on bank risk taking depending on the comparative power of 
shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. 
Existing research further advertises the value of simultaneously examining bank risk, 
ownership structure, and bank regulations. Studying non-financial firms, Agrawal and Mandelker 
(1987) find an inverse relationship between risk taking and the degree of managerial control, while 
John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) find that managers enjoying large private benefits of control select 
sub-optimally conservative investment strategies. Yet, research on bank risk taking typically does not 
incorporate information on each bank’s ownership structure (Keeley, 1990; Kroszner and Rajan, 
1994; Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000; and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). In an 
influential exception, Saunders et al. (1990) find that owner controlled banks exhibit higher risk 
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taking behavior than banks controlled by managers with small shareholdings. They do not, however, 
test whether ownership structure and regulations jointly shape bank risk taking, or whether their 
results generalize beyond the United States to countries with distinct laws and regulations. Indeed, no 
previous research evaluates theoretical predictions concerning the interactive effects of national 
regulations and bank-specific ownership structure on the risk taking behavior of individual banks. 
We frame our empirical analysis around three theoretical keystones. First, diversified owners 
(owners who do not have a large fraction of their personal wealth invested in the bank) tend to 
advocate for more bank risk taking than debt holders and non-shareholder managers (managers who 
do not have a substantial equity stake in the bank). As in any limited liability firm, diversified owners 
have incentives to increase bank risk after collecting funds from bondholders and depositors (Galai 
and Masulis, 1976; Esty, 1998). Similarly, managers with bank-specific human capital skills and 
private benefits of control will tend to advocate for less risk taking than stockholders without those 
skills and benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Kane, 1985). From this 
perspective, banks with an ownership structure that empowers diversified owners will take more risk 
than banks where owners play a more subdued governance role.  
Second, theory predicts that regulations influence the risk taking incentives of diversified 
owners differently from those of debt holders and non-shareholder managers. For example, deposit 
insurance intensifies the ability and incentives of stockholders to increase risk (Merton, 1977; Keeley, 
1990). The impetus for greater risk taking generated by deposit insurance operates on owners, not 
necessarily on non-shareholder managers. As a second example, consider capital regulations. One 
goal of capital regulations is to reduce the risk taking incentives of owners by forcing owners to place 
more of their personal wealth at risk in the bank (Kim and Santomero, 1994). Capital regulations 
need not reduce the risk taking incentives of influential owners, however. Specifically, although 
capital regulations might induce the bank to raise capital, they might not force influential owners to 
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invest more of their wealth in the bank. Indeed, capital regulation might increase risk taking. Owners 
might compensate for the loss of utility from more stringent capital requirements by selecting a 
riskier investment portfolio (Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Buser et al. (1981)), which would 
intensify the conflicts between owners and managers over bank risk taking. As a final example, many 
countries attempt to reduce bank risk taking by restricting banks from engaging in non-lending 
activities, such as securities and insurance underwriting (Boyd et al., 1998). As with capital 
requirements, however, these activity restrictions may reduce the utility of owning a bank, 
intensifying the risk-taking incentives of owners relative to managers. Thus, the impact of regulations 
on risk depends on the comparative influence of owners within the governance structure of each 
bank.  
Third, while banking theory suggests that bank regulations affect the risk taking incentives of 
owners differently from those of managers, corporate governance theory suggests that ownership 
structure and shareholder protection laws affect the ability of owners to influence risk (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). As argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), shareholders with larger voting and cash-
flow rights have correspondingly greater power and incentives to shape corporate behavior than 
smaller owners. From this perspective, ownership structure influences the ability of owners to alter 
bank risk in response both to standard risk shifting incentives and to incentives created by official 
regulations. Shareholder protection laws also affect the ability of owners to adjust bank risk. Besides 
empowering equity holders, effective shareholder protection laws reduce the need for the emergence 
of a large shareholder to mitigate agency problems (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; John et al., 2000; 
Castro et al., 2004). Accordingly, large shareholders will play a less prominent role in shaping 
corporate behavior in economies with effective shareholder protection laws. Thus, we examine how 
ownership structure interacts with both shareholder protection laws and bank regulation in shaping 
the risk taking behavior of individual banks. 
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These theoretical keystones combine to make three testable predictions. First, diversified 
owners have stronger incentives to increase risk than non-shareholding managers, so banks with 
powerful owners will tend to be riskier than widely-held banks, holding other factors constant. 
Second, the role of large owners in shaping risk diminishes in economies with shareholder protection 
laws that effectively empower small owners. Finally, bank regulations – such as capital requirements, 
activity restrictions, and deposit insurance – affect the risk taking incentives of owners differently 
from managers, so the actual impact of regulations on risk taking depends on the comparative power 
of shareholder within each bank’s corporate governance structure. This framework, however, does 
not consider optimal risk taking. Rather, our more modest goal is to provide the first empirical 
assessment of theoretical predictions concerning how a banks’ ownership structure interacts with 
national laws and regulations in shaping bank risk taking. 
To assess these predictions, we compile new data on individual banks from economies with 
different regulations, yielding a database of almost 300 banks across 48 countries. On ownership, we 
first measure whether the bank is widely-held, i.e., the bank does not have a large owner with at least 
ten percent of the bank’s voting rights. We next distinguish among banks with a large owner by 
computing the voting and cash-flow rights of the largest owner. We then collect bank-level data on 
both owners and managers since theory stresses potential tensions between stockholders and 
managers. If managers have accumulated bank-specific human capital or enjoy private benefits of 
control, they will seek less risk taking than stockholders without those skills and benefits (Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985; Kane, 1985). Since tensions between owners and managers might be mitigated when 
senior managers hold large equity stakes (Houston and James, 1995), we calculate and control for (i) 
the voting and cash-flow rights of senior managers and (ii) whether large owners are on the board of 
directors. Theory also suggests that the risk taking incentives of owners will be mitigated if the 
owners have a large portion of their personal wealth invested in the bank. We would optimally like to 
  4  5
have information on each owner’s personal portfolio, but these data are unavailable. Instead, we 
condition on the degree to which the bank is primarily family owned and also test whether there is a 
nonlinear relationship between the cash-flow and voting rights of the controlling shareholder and 
risk. We use three measures of bank risk taking: the bank’s z-score, which is inversely related to the 
probability of bank insolvency, the volatility of equity returns equals, and the volatility of bank 
earnings.  
The key findings are as follows. First, bank risk is generally higher in banks that have large 
owners with substantial cash-flow rights. Consistent with theory, greater cash-flow rights by a large 
owner are associated with more risk. This finding holds when conditioning on international 
differences in bank regulations or when including country fixed effects. Ignoring ownership structure 
provides an incomplete analysis of bank risk taking. 
Second, although more cash-flow rights by a large owner are generally associated with greater 
bank risk, the importance of the large owner is weaker in economies with stronger shareholder 
protection laws. This supports the view that an effective legal system reduces the need for a large 
shareholder to advance the goals of shareholders. It is thus crucial to examine bank governance in 
assessing the determinants of bank risk.    
Third, the relation between risk and regulation depends critically on each bank’s ownership 
structure. Indeed, the relation between regulation and bank risk can actually change sign depending 
on ownership structure. For example, the results suggest that deposit insurance is only associated 
with an increase in risk when the bank has a large equity holder with sufficient power to act on the 
additional risk taking incentives created by deposit insurance. The data also suggest that owners seek 
to compensate for the utility loss from capital regulations and activity restrictions by increasing bank 
risk. Stricter capital regulations and more stringent activity restrictions are associated with greater 
risk when the bank has a sufficiently powerful owner, but stricter capital regulations have the 
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opposite effect in widely-held banks. Ignoring bank governance leads to erroneous conclusions about 
the risk taking effects of banking regulations. 
To explore more fully the channels linking ownership, risk and regulation, we allow for the 
joint determination of bank risk and valuation. Laws, regulations, and ownership structure might 
influence bank risk primarily by altering bank valuations. We therefore allow for the simultaneous 
determination of risk and valuation by extending the work of Keeley (1990) and John et al. (2008). 
We confirm the paper’s results when endogenizing bank valuations. Thus, all of this paper’s findings 
on ownership, shareholder protection laws, regulations, and risk hold beyond any indirect 
connections operating through bank valuations. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the data. Section 3 presents initial 
results. Section 4 assesses how the relation between risk and regulation varies with ownership 
structure. Section 5 simultaneously estimates risk and valuation. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Summary Statistics 
  We build a new database to examine (1) whether ownership structure affects bank risk, (2) 
whether the relationship between ownership structure and bank risk depends on shareholder 
protection laws, and (3) whether the impact of national regulations on bank risk depends on the 
ownership structure of individual banks. Data permitting, we collect information on the 10 largest 
publicly listed banks (as defined by total assets at the end of 2001) in those countries for which La 
Porta et al. (1998) assembled data on shareholder rights. We exclude New Zealand because all its 
major banks are subsidiaries of Australian banks, all of which are already included in the sample. 
Since some countries have data on fewer than ten publicly listed banks, this yields information on a 
maximum of 296 banks across 48 countries. Focusing on the largest banks enhances comparability 
since they tend to comply with international accounting standards and have more liquid shares, 
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reducing concerns that accounting or liquidity differences drive the results. On average, our sample 
accounts for over 80 percent of total banking system assets in each country. When eliminating 
countries for which the sample covers less than 50 percent of total banking assets, the results hold. 
2.1 Ownership Structure: Control Rights and Cash-Flow Rights 
We start with the Caprio et al. (2007) data on bank ownership in 2001, which classifies a bank 
as having a “large owner” if the shareholder has direct and indirect voting rights that sum to 10 
percent or more. If no shareholder holds 10 percent of the voting rights, the bank is classified as 
widely held. This paper’s results hold when using a 20 percent cut-off to define a large owner.  
While direct ownership involves shares registered in the shareholder’s name, indirect 
ownership involves bank shares held by entities that the ultimate shareholder controls. Since the 
principal shareholders of banks are frequently themselves corporations, it is necessary to find the 
major shareholders in these entities. Often, this indirect ownership chain must be traced backwards 
through numerous corporations to identify the ultimate controllers of the votes. For example, a 
shareholder has x percent indirect control over bank A if she controls directly firm C that, in turn, 
controls directly firm B, which directly controls x percent of the votes of bank A. The control chain 
from bank A to firm C can be a long sequence of firms, each of which has control (greater than 10 
percent voting rights) over the next one. If there are several chains of ownership between a single 
shareholder and the bank, we sum the control rights across all of these chains to compute the control 
rights of that shareholder. When multiple shareholders have over 10 percent of the votes, we define 
the “large owner” as the owner with the greatest voting rights. 
The large shareholder may hold cash-flow (CF) rights directly and indirectly. For example, if 
the large shareholder of bank A holds the fraction y of CF rights in firm B and firm B in turn holds 
the fraction x of the CF rights in bank A, then the large shareholder’s indirect CF rights in bank A 
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equals the product of x and y. If there is an ownership chain, we use the products of the CF rights 
along the chain. To compute total CF rights we sum direct and indirect CF rights.  
By focusing on the large shareholder’s CF rights, we capture both the incentives of owners 
toward risk and the ability of owners to influence risk. On ability, we first measure whether the bank 
has a large owner or whether the bank is widely held. Then, conditional on the bank having a large 
owner, we measure the cash-flow rights of the shareholder with the largest number of voting rights. 
CF rights are highly correlated with voting rights, so it provides additional information about the 
power of the largest owner. On incentives, CF rights provide a more direct measure of the risk taking 
incentives of owners than voting rights. Profitable outcomes are distributed to owners based on cash-
flow rights, not through control rights. In robustness tests, we examine the wedge between voting and 
CF rights, which has been the focus of research on the private benefits of control. 
2.2 Management Structure 
We collect new data on each bank’s board structure and managerial ownership. First, we set 
the dummy variable Large Owner on Mgt Board equal to one if the large shareholder has a seat on 
the management board, and zero otherwise. Next, to assess theories about managerial shareholding 
and risk, we compute the CF rights of executive managers and directors and refer to this variable as 
Management Ownership. We collect data on the year the bank was founded and whether the founder 
or the descendents of the founder are on the management or supervisory board. Data on these 
variables are hand-collected using a variety of sources, including Bankers Almanac, Bankscope, 20-F 
filings, annual reports, and company websites. 
2.3 Bank Risk Taking 
We primarily measure bank risk using the z-score of each bank, which equals the return on 
assets plus the capital-asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset returns. The z-score 
measures the distance from insolvency (Roy, 1952). Define insolvency as a state where losses 
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surmount equity (E<-π) (where E is equity and π is profits), A as total assets, ROA (=π/A) as return 
on assets, σ(ROA) as the standard deviation of ROA, and CAR (= E/A) as the capital-asset ratio. The 
probability of insolvency can be expressed as prob (-ROA<CAR). If profits are normally distributed, 
then z = (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), which is the inverse of the probability of insolvency. Thus, z 
indicates the number of standard deviations that a bank’s ROA has to drop below its expected value 
before equity is depleted.  
A higher z-score indicates that the bank is more stable. Since the z-score is highly skewed, we 
use the natural logarithm of the z-score, which is normally distributed. For brevity, we use the label 
“z score” in referring to the natural logarithm of the z-score in the remainder of the paper. 
We have data to calculate the z-score for 288 banks across 48 countries. As listed in Appendix 
1, the number of banks per country varies from ten to one. The paper’s results hold when excluding 
countries with data on only one or two banks. We calculate the average return on assets, its standard 
deviation and the capital-asset ratio over 1996-2001. The accounting data on banks are from 
Bankscope, a commercial database on major international banks. 
We confirm our results when using the volatility of equity returns and the volatility of 
earnings as alternative measures of bank risk. Volatility of equity returns equals the annualized 
volatility of weekly equity returns in 2001, which is also used by Saunders et al. (1990) and Esty 
(1998). We use the total return index (that includes reinvested dividends) from Datastream. One 
advantage of the volatility of equity returns is that it is based on market, rather than accounting, data. 
One disadvantage is that using equity volatility as a measure of risk reduces our sample because we 
only have weekly data on stock market returns for 219 out of 288 banks. The Volatility of earnings 
equals the standard deviation of the ratio of total earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions to 
average total assets, computed over the period 1996-2001. 
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Finally, we also confirm the results using risk measures computed after 2001, which is the 
year in which we observe bank ownership. The advantage of this approach is that risk is measured 
after ownership. The disadvantage is that we lose a large portion of our sample because of mergers, 
acquisitions, and bank failures. The 2001-sample we focus on in the paper includes about 50% more 
countries and 60% more banks than the smaller sample based on post-2001 risk measures. 
2.4 Investor Protection Laws  
RIGHTS is the La Porta et al. (1998) index of the statutory rights of shareholders. It ranges 
from zero to six, where larger values indicate greater shareholder rights. The six components in this 
index are: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail proxy votes; (2) shareholders are not required 
to deposit shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional 
representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities 
mechanism exists; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for 
an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent; and (6) when 
shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting. 
  2.5 Bank Regulations 
This paper evaluates theoretical predictions that key bank regulations interact with ownership 
structure to shape each bank’s risk taking behavior. In selecting data on regulation from the Barth et 
al. (2006) database, we use two criteria. First, we choose regulations stressed by the Basel 
Committee. Second, we analyze regulations that theory highlights as affecting bank behavior. Thus, 
we examine deposit insurance, capital regulations, and regulatory restrictions on bank activities.  
DI is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the country has deposit insurance, and zero 
otherwise, and is calculated from Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2008). Note, DI equals one both when the 
country has explicit deposit insurance and when depositors were fully compensated the last time a 
bank failed if the country did not have formal deposit insurance. 
  10  11
CAPITAL is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital from Barth et al. (2006). This 
index includes information on whether the source of funds that count as regulatory capital can include 
assets other than cash, government securities, or borrowed funds, and whether the authorities verify 
the sources of capital. CAPITAL also includes information on the extent of regulatory requirements 
regarding the amount of capital banks must hold.
1
RESTRICT is an index of regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks from Barth et al. 
(2006). This index measures regulatory impediments to banks engaging in (1) securities market 
activities (e.g., underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry), (2) 
insurance activities (e.g., insurance underwriting and selling), (3) real estate activities (e.g., real estate 
investment, development, and management), and (4) the ownership of nonfinancial firms.  
     2.6 Other Country-Level and Bank-Level Control Variables 
We control for numerous country-level and bank-level characteristics. At the country-level, 
we control for the level of economic development, aggregate economic volatility, institutional 
development, the degree of competition in national banking markets, and whether the authorities have 
taken over a failing bank since 1995. At the bank-level, product market conditions influence the 
resolution of conflicting interests among stockholders, managers, and depositors. For instance, 
Gorton and Rosen (1995) argue that intense competition that lowers the franchise value of incumbent 
banks intensifies incentives for both stockholders and managers to increase risk. Consequently, we 
control for bank growth, size, liquidity, loan loss provisions, and whether the bank accounts for more 
than ten percent of the nation’s deposits.  
                                                 
1 The index is based on the following questions: (1) Is the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement risk weighted in line 
with the Basel guidelines?; (2) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk?; (3) Are market value of loan 
losses not realized in accounting books deducted from capital?; (4) Are unrealized losses in securities portfolios 
deducted?; (5) Are unrealized foreign exchange losses deducted?; (6) What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part 
of capital?; (7) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities?; (8) Can 
the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other than cash or government securities?; 
and (9) Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds? 
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As stressed above and discussed in more detail below, we pay special attention to bank 
valuation. We measure bank valuation using the Tobin’s Q of each bank, which equals the market 
value of equity plus the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of assets. We 
simultaneously estimate risk and valuation to better assess the potential channels linking regulations, 
ownership, valuations, and bank risk. 
2.7 Summary Statistics 
There is great variation in bank fragility across countries. Table 1 provides summary statistics 
and Appendix 1 lists the averages of key variables for each country’s banks. Column (1) of Appendix 
1 presents the average of z-scores across all banks for each country in the sample. The z-scores 
indicate that profits have to fall by more than 66 times their standard deviation in Austria to deplete 
bank equity, but profits only need to fall by less than one standard deviation in Thailand to eliminate 
bank equity. Our estimates of equity volatility of banks display a similar variation (Appendix 1, 
column 2). Volatility of equity returns vary from a low of 12 percent per annum in Austria to a high 
of 118 percent in Peru. The average equity volatility is 40 percent.  
Ownership and management structure vary enormously. As shown in Table 1 and Appendix 
1, the large owner averages more than 50 percent of the CF rights in 8 out of 48 countries, but in 5 
other countries there is either no bank with a large owner or the average degree of CF rights is less 
than five percent. Although more than 90 percent of the banks in Canada, Ireland, and the United 
States (in our sample) are widely held, 22 out of 48 countries do not have a single widely held bank 
(among their largest banks). Overall, the cross-country average for widely held is only 29 percent so 
that in the average country, 71 percent of the largest, listed banks have a large owner. Furthermore, 
there is considerable variability in managerial ownership. For 35 percent of banks, the large owner 
(the largest owner with more than 10 percent of the voting rights) is also a senior manager. However, 
on average, managerial ownership is only 6% of total bank shares. Indeed, for half of the countries in 
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our sample, no bank has managerial shareholdings of greater than 1%. The standard deviation of 
managerial shareholdings is 15%. Finally, we find that the original founder of the bank continues to 
manage the bank in 3 percent of the banks in our sample, and a descendant of the founder is a 
manager in 14 percent of the banks. Thus, we consider a broad cross-section of countries to assess the 
relation between risk and ownership.  
The simple correlation matrix in Table 2 shows that more stable banks (as measured by higher 
z-score or lower equity volatilities) have lower CF rights, and are located in countries with fewer 
activity restrictions. Furthermore, risk is higher in banks where the large shareholder is a senior 
manager. As shown below, however, the relationship between these private governance mechanisms 
and risk depends on national policies. Furthermore, the z-score and equity volatility are (negatively) 
correlated with a statistically significant correlation coefficient of 38 percent, while the correlation 
between z-score and earnings volatility is 37 percent and also statistically significant.  
 
3. Bank Risk: First Results 
In this section, we begin by examining the relationship between risk taking by banks and their 
ownership structures. The primary measure of ownership structure is the CF rights of the largest 
owner, where CF rights equals zero if the bank is widely held.  We examine whether greater CF 
rights by the largest owner is associated with greater risk as suggested by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and John, Litov, and Yeung (2008). In the next section, we extend the analysis by testing 
whether the relation between risk and ownership structure varies with national laws and regulations. 
Finally, in section 5, we also allow for the endogenous determination of the Tobin’s Q of each bank. 
This is crucial because laws, regulations, and ownership may influence bank risk by influencing bank 
valuations. 
More formally, we estimate the following equation: 
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Zb,c = α*Xb,c + β*CFb,c + γ*Rc + δ*CFb,c*Rc + u b,c, 
where Zb,c is the z-score of bank b in country c, Xb,c is a matrix of bank-level control variables, CFb,c 
is cash-flow rights of bank b in country c, Rc are country-level measures of bank regulations and 
shareholder rights, u b,c is the error term, and α, β, γ, and δ are vectors of coefficient estimates. As 
noted, in this section we do not consider interactions between bank-level ownership structure and 
national regulations and shareholder rights (CFb,c*Rc ). We examine these interactions in section 4. 
We begin by using ordinary least squares (OLS) with clustering at the country level. Then, in section 
5, we use a simultaneous equations system to allow for the joint determination of risk and valuation. 
3.1 Ownership Structure and Bank Risk: OLS and Country-Fixed Effects 
The overarching message from the regressions presented in Table 3 is that greater CF rights 
by a large owner is associated with greater risk. In each of the ten bank-level regressions, the standard 
errors are adjusted to control for clustering at the country-level. Regression 1 simply controls for 
recent bank performance (Revenue growth) and the CF rights (CF) of the large owner, where CF 
equals zero if the bank is widely-held. CF enters negatively and significantly at the one percent level, 
indicating that the existence of a large owner with substantial cash-flow rights is associated with 
greater risk. The economic size of the coefficient on CF is consequential. A one standard deviation 
change in CF (0.28) is associated with a change in z-score of 0.42 (=0.28*1.5), where the mean of z-
score is 2.8 and the standard deviation is about one.  
These results are consistent with the following view: (1) Owners tend to advocate for more 
bank risk taking than managers and debt holders (Galai and Masulis, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) 
and (2) Large owners with substantial cash-flow rights have greater incentives and power to increase 
bank risk taking than small shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; John et al., 2008).  Thus, CF is 
positively associated with bank risk.  
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The positive association between CF and risk holds when controlling for country traits and 
even when including country-fixed effects. To control for the possibility that the relation between 
ownership structure and bank risk primarily reflects cross-country differences, rather than cross-bank 
differences, in ownership structure, we (a) control for many country-specific traits, including the 
level of economic development in each bank’s country (Per capita income), and (b) include country 
fixed effects. As shown in Table 3, the results are robust to conditioning on Per capita income and 
numerous country characteristics (Regression 2). Furthermore, CF continues to enter negatively and 
significantly at the six percent level when controlling for country fixed effects (Regression 3). While 
the economic size of the coefficient on CF drops by about 50% when controlling for country fixed 
effects, the analysis still indicates that more CF rights by a large owner is associated with more risk 
taking. We also controlled for outliers.  Specifically, exclude each country one-at-a-time to test 
whether the banks from any single country determine the results.  All of the results hold.  
These results suggest that the connection between risk and ownership structure does not 
simply reflect the possibility that successful countries adopt good laws, regulations, and institutions 
that (a) induce banks to behave prudently and (b) allow owners to diversify their holdings. Rather, 
when only focusing on cross-bank variation, we find a strong association between ownership 
structure and risk. 
3.2. Alternative Measures of Bank Stability 
Thus far, we have focused on the z-score of individual banks computed over the period 1996-
2001. We used alternative measures of risk: (i) Equity volatility equals the volatility of the bank’s 
equity returns over the period 1999-2001, (ii) Earnings volatility equals the volatility of the bank’s 
earnings over the period 1996-2001, and (iii) Z-score (02-04) equals the z-score computed over the 
period 2002 to 2004, which measures the z-score a few years after we observe ownership structure. 
As noted, however, this reduces the sample quite substantially. Since the volatility of equity returns 
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and the volatility of earnings are positively related to risk, we expect the opposite signs on the 
estimated coefficients when these volatility measures replace z-score as the dependent variable.  
As shown in Table 3, Regressions 5 to 7, the key results on ownership are robust to using 
alternative measures of bank risk taking. Higher CF is associated with greater risk taking. Though the 
result are somewhat weaker with Earnings volatility, CF enters negatively and significantly with a p-
value of 0.06 even with this measure that can be subject to substantial manipulation by banks. In sum, 
the Table 3 results emphasize a robust connection between risk and ownership structure. 
  3.3 Additional Robustness Tests 
We conducted a series of additional robustness tests. We had concerns about the ownership 
structure indicators. For instance, we are mixing firms with a large owner (CF>0) with widely-held 
firms (CF=0). We restricted the sample to only firms with a large owner and confirmed the results. 
We were also concerned about defining large owners using the ten percent voting rights cut-off. We 
confirmed all of the results using a 20 percent cut-off. We were also concerned that the state is the 
large owner in almost 20 percent of the banks. If the state has different attitudes toward risk from 
those of private equity holders, then state controlled banks should be treated separately. When we 
include a dummy variable for state banks, however, this dummy enters insignificantly and it does not 
alter the other results. 
Critically, some theories suggest that owners with a very large proportion of their wealth tied 
to the bank will take less risk (for example, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Saunders et al., 1990, and 
Kane, 1985). We included a dummy variable that takes on the value one if CF is above the sample 
median and zero otherwise. Including this dummy variable does not change the results, and it does 
not enter significantly. We also entered CF-squared to test for nonlinearities, but the quadratic term 
did not enter significantly. Moreover, we also controlled whether the bank is family owned and 
operated, which would suggest that the owners have a large amount of wealth and human capital 
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committed to the bank (Bennedsen et al., 2007, and Perez-Gonzalez, 2006).  Specifically, we control 
for whether the founder of the bank, or a descendent of the founder, is on the banks’ management or 
supervisory board.  Controlling for family ownership did not alter any of the results. 
Furthermore, considerable research focuses on pyramidal ownership structures in which 
voting rights are much greater than CF rights. The “Wedge” between voting and CF rights is used to 
gauge the degree to which owners have the power and incentives to expropriate bank resources 
(Caprio et al., 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2007, 2008). In focusing on risk, theory suggests that CF 
rights are crucial, not the Wedge. Indeed, Wedge does not enter this paper’s regressions significantly 
and it does not affect our main results. 
In addition, this paper’s results hold when eliminating banks associated with major mergers 
and acquisitions. We were concerned that banks about to experience a major event might behave 
differently and these banks might drive this paper’s results.  Consequently, we trace the ownership 
history of each bank and identify whether the bank has undergone a major acquisition or merger 
between 2001 and 2005. All of the findings hold when eliminating these banks. 
Finally, we computed ownership structure in 2005 for a sub-sample of 200 banks from the 
2001 sample. Ownership structure is very stable over time. Except when banks experience a major 
event, such as a merger or acquisition, ownership structure does not vary. This indicates that 
ownership structure does not respond to short-run fluctuations in bank risk. It also implies that 
changes in ownership structure do not account for high frequency changes in risk. While economic 
and financial stability at low frequencies could influence ownership structure in the long-run, this 
paper’s results hold when conditioning on the volatility of each country’s Gross Domestic Product as 
we discuss below.  In addition, since ownership structure does not change much unless a bank 
experiences a merger or acquisition and since mergers and acquisitions generally make accounting 
data incomparable over time, this reduces the value of panel studies in this context. 
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3.4 Ownership Structure and Bank Risk: Identification and Many Controls 
We were concerned that the joint determination of risk and ownership structure could bias the 
results. For instance, high risk banks might form concentrated ownership structures if diffuse 
shareholders have difficulty monitoring risky investments. In the estimation equation, z = b*Z + e, 
where z is the vector of bank z-scores, Z the matrix of all explanatory variables, e the error term, and 
b the vector of estimated coefficients. OLS is consistent only if Cov{e, Zi} = 0 for each regressor i, 
i.e., OLS is consistent only if there are no unobservable factors affecting both ownership and risk.  
We address this concern using a variety of strategies. While none is perfect, they all yield the 
same conclusion: Larger CF is associated with greater risk. Nonetheless, we interpret the results very 
cautiously: These results on the partial correlation between risk and ownership structure represent 
some initial, descriptive findings that begin to integrate traditional corporate governance forces into 
the study of bank risk taking. Furthermore, the paper’s major emphasis is on assessing whether the 
relation between bank regulations and bank risk will vary in a theoretically predictable manner with 
bank ownership structure. As we show in the next section, the empirical results are consistent with 
these predictions. 
3.4.1 Many controls 
A commonly used strategy for reducing concerns that Cov{u, Xi} ≠  0 is to “saturate” the 
regression with a large number of bank and country characteristics to capture as much of the error 
term u as possible (see also Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, and Bitler et al., 2005). We control for 
numerous country- and bank-level traits in Regressions 8 to 10 of Table 3. Besides Per capita GDP, 
we include indicators of capital regulations (Capital), activity restrictions (Restrict), deposit insurance 
(DI), shareholder protection rights (Rights), and the degree to which the law is fairly and effectively 
enforced in a country (Enforce). At the banking system level, we include a measure of banking 
system concentration that equals the percentage of banking system assets held by the five largest 
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banks (Concentration) since many debate the link between concentration and risk (Allen and Gale, 
2000, and Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005). We also condition on the mergers and acquisitions activities 
of all firms in a country (M&A) since M&A activity might affect bank governance (Schranz (1993) 
and Berger et al. (1998)). Furthermore, in unreported regressions, conditioned on measures of official 
corruption, the degree to which the rule of law operates in the country, GDP volatility, and the return 
on assets averaged across all banks in each country. These did not affect the conclusions. 
At the bank-level, we control for (1) the extent to which senior managers hold shares in the 
bank (Managerial ownership) and (2) whether the large owner (if there is a large owner) is on the 
management board (Large owner on mgt board).  We also condition on revenue growth, size, loan 
loss provisions, and the liquidity ratio. Moreover, in unreported regressions, we also find that the 
results hold when including dummy variables of whether the bank holds more than ten percent of the 
country’s deposits (to gauge if the bank is “too-big-to-fail”) and whether the bank was recently 
intervened by the government. 
Even when conditioning on all of these country- and bank-level characteristics, CF rights are 
positively associated with risk. In Table 3, Restrict and DI both enter negatively and significantly, 
suggesting that activity restrictions and deposit insurance increase bank risk, confirming findings by 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) and Barth et al. (2004, 2006). Critically, CF continues to 
enter the z-score regression negatively and significantly, with the same coefficient size. 
3.4.2 Instrumental variables 
We use instrumental variables for each bank’s ownership structure. We primarily use the 
average CF rights of other banks in the country, which captures industry and country factors 
explaining CF. A positive feature of this instrument is that innovations in the risk of one bank will 
not influence the cash-flow rights of other banks. If innovations in national bank risk affect bank 
ownership across all banks, however, then this instrument will not reduce endogeneity bias. Yet, this 
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seems unlikely because (i) we find that bank ownership changes extremely little over time and (ii) the 
results hold when controlling for national economic volatility.
2  
The instrumental variable results confirm that CF is negatively and significantly associated 
with bank z-score, supporting the view that a large owner with sufficient incentives tends to increase 
bank risk taking (Table 3, Regression 4). The instrument (i) enters the first-stage regression 
significantly at the one percent level as demonstrated by the F-test of excluded instruments, (ii) 
accounts for 17 percent of the variance of CF rights in the first-stage as indicated by the partial R-
squared of excluded instruments, and (iii) yields a different vector of coefficient estimates from those 
obtained using OLS as shown by the Hausman test of endogeneity. The fact that the IV estimate of 
the coefficient on CF is larger in absolute value terms than the OLS estimate suggests that OLS 
underestimates the true causal effect of CF on bank stability.  
In unreported regressions, we confirm these findings using alternative instruments. As a 
different instrument for CF, we identified the year in which the bank was founded (Founded). Older 
banks have had more time to diversify ownership. Also, Founded is unlikely to affect bank risk 
directly. Rather, by reducing CF of the largest owner, Founded affects the incentives of the owner to 
influence risk. Founded enters the first-stage regression with a p-value of 0.059, accounting for 3 
percent of the variation of CF. If the age of the bank is correlated with an unobserved bank-specific 
trait that drives bank risk, however, then Founded is an invalid instrument; but, a test of the over-
identifying restrictions does not reject the validity of Founded as an instrument. Next, we include a 
dummy variable denoting whether the founder of the bank is on the management or supervisory 
board (Founder) as an instrument. If the founder of the bank is still on the management or 
supervisory board, this implies a continuing large, controlling role with correspondingly high CF. 
                                                 
2 For regressions using the average CF rights of other banks in the country as an instrumental variable, we exclude 
countries with only one bank because we can only compute the CF instrument for countries with more than one bank, 
which accounts for the drop in country coverage from 46 to 43 countries in regression 4. 
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The partial correlation coefficient between CF and Founder is 0.17. One concern with Founder is that 
shocks to risk might affect the probability of the founder being on the board. Again, the over-
identifying restrictions test does not reject the validity of the instruments and we confirm the results 
in Table 3. 
 
4. Bank Ownership, Shareholder Protection Laws, and Regulation 
Beyond yielding predictions about the bivariate relation between risk and ownership structure, 
some theories suggest that the relation between bank risk and ownership structure will vary with 
national laws and regulations (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, Buser et al., 1981, John et al., 2000, 
and John et al., 2008); theories do not simply yield predictions about the bivariate relation between 
risk and ownership structure. Thus, now examine whether the relation between risk and ownership 
structure depends on shareholder protection laws and bank regulations, consistent with theoretical 
predictions. If the empirical results on these conditional relations are consistent with theory, then any 
alternative explanation will also have to account for these interactive results, not simply the positive 
partial correlation between risk and CF.  
Table 4 presents a series of regressions in which we examine the direct and interactive 
associations among ownership structure, shareholder protection laws, regulations, and bank risk. 
Specifically, we include Rights, Capital, Restrict, and DI in all five regressions.
3 Then, we include the 
interaction term of each of these national traits with bank-level ownership structure.  
Table 4 indicates that the relation between a bank’s risk and ownership structure depends on 
shareholder protection laws. The Rights indicator does not enter significantly, indicating that 
                                                 
3 Since we are examining individual banks, we were not very concerned that an individual bank’s risk will affect national 
regulations. Nonetheless, these results hold when using instrumental variables for regulations. Based on Beck et al. (2003, 
2006) and Barth et al. (2006), we use legal origin and the religious composition of each country as instruments for bank 
regulation. Given that we condition on the level of income per capita, the most direct impact of religion and legal origin 
on bank risk runs through bank regulations, rather than by altering bank risk through an alternative channel. Moreover, we 
do not reject the hypothesis that the instruments only explain risk through their impact on regulation. 
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shareholder protection laws do not exert a direct effect on bank risk.
4 This does not, however, imply 
that shareholder protection laws are unimportant for bank risk taking. If the legal system protects 
minority shareholder rights effectively, then ownership will not have to be as concentrated to induce 
managers to act in the interests of shareholders.  
Consistent with theory predicting that investor protection reduces expropriation by controlling 
shareholders (for example, Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002, and John et al., 2008), we find that a 
marginal increase in CF is associated with a smaller increase in bank risk in countries with stronger 
shareholder protection laws (Table 4, regression 1). Indeed, in countries with the highest level of 
shareholder rights (Rights equals 5) a marginal increase in the CF rights of the largest shareholder is 
not associated with a significant increase bank risk. Thus, ignoring shareholder protection laws yields 
incomplete conclusions about the relationship between bank risk and ownership structure. 
Next, consider capital regulations, which have been the focus of international and national 
regulatory approaches to promoting the safety and soundness of banking systems. To induce prudent 
risk taking, capital regulations require bank owners to have more of their wealth at risk and to 
increase the amount of capital at risk as a bank’s assets become more risky. Nonetheless, since 
binding capital regulations reduce the utility of owning a bank, banks’ owners might seek to increase 
risk in response to those capital regulations. Moreover, any adjustment to risk might depend on the 
incentives and power of the owner, as measured by CF.  
Table 4 shows that the sign of the relationship between risk and capital regulations (Capital) 
depends materially on each bank’s ownership structure. In the regressions that include the interaction 
between CF and Capital, Capital enters positively and significantly. Consistent with standard 
approaches to bank regulation, this finding indicates that the direct effect of capital regulations is to 
                                                 
4 Furthermore, uninsured creditors of the bank might reduce bank risk. Thus, we also examined whether economies with 
stronger legal protection of creditors, as measured by the La Porta et al. (1998) index of creditor rights, have lower levels 
of bank risk. In unreported regressions, we do not find a significant relationship between the creditor rights index and 
bank risk taking, and conditioning on this country-trait does not alter the findings on the other variables. 
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enhance bank stability. The results, however, also indicate that the impact of capital regulations 
depends on ownership structure. Note that the interaction term CF*Capital enters negatively and 
significantly in regressions 2 and 5. This shows that the stabilizing effects of capital regulations 
diminish when the bank has a large owner with the incentives and power to increase bank risk. 
Indeed, with a sufficiently large owner, capital regulations will increase bank risk. Ignoring the 
interactions between national policies and the ownership structure of individual banks will lead to 
erroneous inferences about the impact of capital regulations on bank risk. 
In terms of the economic effects, capital regulations have very different implications for the 
risk taking behavior of widely-held banks relative to banks with a majority owner. For instance, the 
estimates in Table 4 regression 2 suggest that bank risk will fall by 0.3 standard deviations if there is 
a one standard deviation increase in Capital (1.25) when the bank is widely-held (i.e., CF equals 
zero). But, bank risk will rise by 0.2 standard deviations if there is a one standard deviation increase 
in Capital when the bank has an owner where CF equals 50 percent. Both the reduction and increase 
in risk are statistically significant. 
The association between risk and activity restrictions also depends crucially on the ownership 
structure of individual banks. While many countries attempt to reduce risk by restricting banks from 
engaging in non-lending activities, theory suggests that these regulations might have unintended 
effects. Bank owners might seek to compensate for the utility loss from stricter restrictions by 
increasing risk. Theory further suggests that owners will have greater incentives and power to 
increase risk if they have larger CF rights. In the regressions that include the interaction between CF 
and Restrict, Restrict enters negatively, though insignificantly at the five percent level. Thus, an 
increase in Restrict is not associated with a significant change in a bank’s risk if the bank is widely-
held. However, the interaction term CF*Restrict enters negatively and significantly in regressions 3 
and 5. When a bank has a large owner, activity restrictions boost risk. For instance, the estimates in 
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Table 4 regression 3 suggest that bank risk will rise by 0.4 standard deviations if there is a one 
standard deviation increase in Restrict (2.40) and if the bank has an owner where CF equals 50 
percent. 
The evidence on deposit insurance further emphasizes that ignoring the interactions between 
national regulations and the ownership structure of individual banks leads to flawed conclusions 
about the impact of regulations on bank risk. In particular, explicit deposit insurance has very 
different implications for the risk taking behavior of a widely-held bank relative to a bank with a 
majority owner. The estimates in Table 4 regression 4 suggest that bank risk will rise by a statistically 
significant 0.4 standard deviations in response to a one standard deviation increase in DI (0.41) if the 
bank has a large owner with CF equal to 50 percent. But, DI is not associated with a significant 
increase in bank risk when the bank is widely-held. From this perspective, explicit deposit insurance 
does not have much of an effect on bank risk in a country like the United States where all ten of the 
largest banks are widely-held. In India and Indonesia where large banks tend to have concentrated 
ownership, however, deposit insurance is associated with significantly greater risk. 
   
5. Simultaneous Determination of Bank Valuation and Risk 
  To assess more comprehensively the mechanisms relating bank ownership, shareholder 
protection laws, regulation, and risk, we allow for the joint determination of bank risk and bank 
valuations. Laws, regulations, and ownership structure might influence bank risk by affecting bank 
valuations. If laws and regulations reduce a bank’s value, this could increase the risk taking 
incentives of owners as argued by Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Buser et al. (1981). However, 
regulation might affect risk through an assortment of other channels, including the response by 
borrowing firms to changes in interest rates induced by regulation (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005), the 
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screening incentives and capabilities of investors (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991), and the degree of 
competition in banking (Hellmann et al., 2000). 
  Following Keeley (1990), we control for the endogenous determination of risk and bank 
valuation and test whether there is an association between risk and bank regulations independent of 
bank valuation. In the second stage of a two-stage least squared system, Z-score is modeled exactly 
as in Table 4, except that we also include Tobin’s Q. In the first stage, Tobin’s Q (Q) is modeled both 
as a function of (1) the numerous bank-level and country-level control variables used in the risk 
equation and (2) as a function of variables excluded from the second stage. These excluded variables 
include (i) a dummy variable for whether the bank is listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), (ii) a dummy variable for whether the country has entry restrictions that protect banks from 
competition, and (iii) the bank’s market share as measured by assets. As in Keeley (1990), the 
identifying assumption is that these excluded variables explain cross-bank differences in valuation 
but the excluded variables only explain bank risk through their impact on Q. 
Keeley (1990) uses the liberalization of laws governing branch restrictions in the US as an 
instrument for Q to assess the impact of exogenous changes in Q on bank risk taking. He argues that 
these liberalizations are an “easily observed exogenous factor with respect to bank risk taking”. At 
the same time, these regulatory entry barriers reduce competition between banks, enhancing the 
market power and franchise value of banks, as captured by Q, and are thus a potentially valid 
instrument for Q. Following Keeley (1990), we use a regulatory index of entry barriers at the 
country-level as instrument for Q. We also include the bank’s market share of assets in the set of 
instrumental variables to proxy for market power. The results are qualitatively similar when we use 
the market share of deposits. The NYSE listing dummy variable is included to capture other valuation 
trends not related to changes in market power, such as the liquidity enhancing effect of a NYSE 
listing. Also, valuation may be enhanced by the strict disclosure requirements of NYSE listings. 
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  Table 5 presents the complete first-stage and second-stage results. Table 5 gives the partial R
2 
and the F-test of the excluded instruments in the first-stage to assess whether these instruments 
explain cross-bank differences in Q. The three instrumental variables explain between 8 and 13 
percent of the cross-bank variation in Q. The F-tests rejects the hypothesis that these instruments can 
be excluded from the first-stage at the one percent significance level. Furthermore, in all of the 
specifications, the overidentification test supports the hypothesis that the instruments are valid, i.e., 
we do not reject the assumption that the instruments only explain bank risk through their effect on Q. 
Also, the first-stage results indicate that Q is higher in countries with stronger shareholder protection 
laws, which is consistent with the findings in Caprio et al. (2007). 
Table 5 confirms all of this paper’s results while controlling for the endogenous determination 
of Q.
5 First, the relationship between risk and ownership structure depends on shareholder protection 
laws. When the legal system protects minority shareholder rights effectively, a marginal increase in 
the cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder is not associated with an increase in bank risk.  
Second, although capital regulations have a direct, positive association with bank stability, 
they also increase the risk-taking incentives of bank owners. The net effect of capital regulations on 
risk, therefore, depends on the ability of the owner to increase bank risk. We find that capital 
regulations are actually associated with greater risk when the bank has a sufficiently large owner. 
Ignoring the interactions between regulations and the ownership of individual banks yields invalid 
conclusions about the impact of regulations on risk.  
Finally, the results are similar for deposit insurance and activity restrictions. To promote 
stability, many countries restrict banks from engaging in non-lending activities. But, bank owners 
might seek to compensate for the utility loss by increasing risk. This is what we find. When a bank 
has a large owner, activity restrictions are associated with an increase bank risk, but activity 
                                                 
5 The results also hold when simply including Tobin’s Q into the OLS regressions in Table 4.  
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restrictions are associated with an increase in risk when the bank is widely-held. Similarly, countries 
adopt deposit insurance to eliminate bank runs, but deposit insurance intensifies standard moral 
hazard problems. The ability of owners to act on these incentives depends on bank ownership 
structure. Even when controlling for Q, we find that bank risk does not rise in response to deposit 
insurance when the bank is widely-held. When a large bank owner has sufficient CF rights, however, 
deposit insurance is associated with an increase in risk.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we conducted the first empirical assessment of theories concerning the 
relationships among risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations.  
Theory highlights the potential conflicts between bank managers and owners over bank risk taking 
and stresses that the same bank regulation will have different effects on bank risk taking depending 
on the comparative power of shareholders in the governance structure of each bank.  Besides 
assessing theories from corporate finance and banking, this analysis is crucial from a public policy 
perspective because bank risk taking affects economic fragility, business cycle fluctuations, and 
economic growth.  
We find that banks with more powerful owners tend take greater risks, but the relation 
between ownership and risk weakens in economies with stronger shareholder protection laws. This is 
consistent with theories predicting that (i) equity holders have stronger incentives to increase risk 
than non-shareholding managers and debt holders, (ii) large owners with substantial cash flows have 
the power and incentives to induce the bank’s managers to increase risk taking, but (iii) effective 
legal protection of small shareholders reduces the need for the emergence of large owners to mitigate 
agency problems in order to boost bank risk taking.  
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Furthermore, the impact of bank regulations on bank risk depends critically on each bank’s 
ownership structure. Indeed, the effect of the same regulation on a bank’s risk taking can be positive 
– or negative – depending on the bank’s ownership structure. Consistent with theory, we find that 
ignoring ownership structure leads to incomplete and sometimes erroneous conclusions about the 
impact of capital regulations, deposit insurance, and activity restrictions on bank risk taking.
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics of the main variables. Z-score is the z score of the bank; the higher the score, the lower the probability of bank default. Equity volatility is 
the 3-year period volatility of the equity returns of the bank. Earnings volatility is the 5-year period average standard deviation of the ratio of total earnings before taxes and 
loan loss provisions to average total assets. CF is cash flow rights of the largest shareholder of the bank. Large owner on mgt board is a dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if a large shareholder has a seat on the management board of the company. Managerial ownership equals the total cash-flow rights of senior management. Revenue growth 
is the growth in total revenues of the bank over the past year. State is a dummy variable denoting whether the state is the largest shareholder in the bank. Market share is the 
bank’s share in total deposits in the country. NYSE takes a value of 1 if the bank is listed or has an ADR on the NYSE. Size is the log of total assets. Loan loss provision ratio 
is the ratio of the bank’s loan loss provisions to net interest income. Liquidity ratio is the bank’s liquid assets to liquid liabilities. Too-big-to-fail is a dummy variable that takes 
a value of one if the bank’s share in the country’s total deposits exceeds 10%. Per capita income is the log of GDP per capita of the country. Rights is an index of anti-director 
rights. Capital is an index of capital regulation. Restrict is an index of activity restrictions. DI is a dummy variable indicating whether the country has explicit deposit insurance 
(and/or has made depositors whole the last time a bank failed). Enforce is an index of enforcement of contracts. Law is a measure of law and order tradition. M&A activity is 
the percentage of traded companies listed on the country’s stock exchange that have been targeted in completed mergers or acquisitions deals during the 1990s. GDP volatility 
equals the standard deviation of the logarithm of real annual GDP growth over the period 1996-2001. 
 
Variable  Number of banks  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Bank-level          
Z-score       
     
       
       
     
        
       
       
       
     
       
     
     
287  0.99 2.85  -1.56 5.14
Equity volatility  219  0.47  0.36  0.03  4.50 
Earnings volatility  263  0.86  1.45  0.03  12.17 
  CF 296  0.28 0.27  0.00 1.00
Large owner on mgt board  296  0.35  0.48  0.00  1.00 
Managerial ownership  292  0.06  0.15  0.00  0.68 
Revenue growth  269  0.02  0.23  -0.86  1.87 
State 296  0.38 0.18  0.00 1.00
Market share  254  0.14  0.21  0.00  1.84 
NYSE 296  0.33 0.12  0.00 1.00
Size 271  2.08 16.19  10.94   20.77
Loan loss provision ratio  263  0.24  0.36  -2.56  2.64 
Liquidity ratio  260  0.04  0.05  0.00  0.50 
Country-level 
Per capita income  48  8.79  1.49  5.54  10.70 
Rights 48  1.31 2.98  0.00 5.00
Capital 41  1.25 3.12  0.00 5.00
Restrict 41  2.40 9.02  5.00 14.00
DI 47  0.41 0.79  0.00   1.00
Enforce 47  2.15 7.13  3.55 9.99
Law 48  2.62 6.78  1.90   10.00
M&A 44  18.65 23.90  0.00   65.63




         
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
This table reports the correlations between the main variables. Z-score is the z score of the bank; the higher the score, the lower the probability of bank default. Equity volatility 
is the 3-year period volatility of the equity returns of the bank. Earnings volatility is the 5-year period average standard deviation of the ratio of total earnings before taxes and 
loan loss provisions to average total assets. CF is cash flow rights of the largest shareholder of the bank. Revenue growth is the growth in total revenues of the bank over the 
past year. Large owner on mgt board is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a large shareholder has a seat on the management board of the company. Managerial 
ownership equals the total cash-flow rights of senior management. Per capita income is GDP per capita. Rights is an index of anti-director rights. Capital is an index of capital 
regulation. Restrict is an index of activity restrictions. DI is a dummy variable indicating whether the country has explicit deposit insurance. P-values denoting the significant 














income  Rights Capital Restrict
Equity  volatility                  ***-0.329 
  (0.000)                 
                 
               
               
               
                     
                     
                       
                     
               
                     
                 
                     
       
                     
                       
                     
           





CF ***-0.377  ***0.265  ***0.392
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)
Revenue growth 
 
-0.036  0.002  ***0.317  **0.137               
(0.556) (0.980) (0.000) (0.025)
Large owner on mgt board 
 
***-0.230  ***0.211  ***0.184  ***0.458  0.086             
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.162)
Managerial  ownership
 
-0.040 ***0.202 0.041 ***0.229 0.054 ***0.236
(0.502) (0.003) (0.510) (0.000) (0.383) (0.000)
Per capita income 
 
***0.306  ***-0.274  ***-0.337  ***-0.313 ***-0.191 ***-0.395 **-0.139
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.018)
Rights
 
***0.171  **-0.160  ***-0.192  ***-0.183 -0.048 -0.070 -0.059 0.040
(0.004) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) (0.431) (0.228) (0.313) (0.492)
Capital
 
**-0.155  0.008  **0.166  0.037  **0.135  *0.104  *-0.107  -0.077  0.052
(0.014) (0.915) (0.012) (0.555) (0.039) (0.095) (0.088) (0.213) (0.407)
Restrict
 
***-0.329 ***0.347 ***0.325 ***0.235 0.097 ***0.343 0.049 ***-0.294 *-0.113 ***0.236
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 
(0.138) (0.000) (0.434) (0.000) (0.068) (0.000)
DI **-0.151 -0.045  **0.146 0.031  -0.031  -0.070 -0.055 ***0.219  *-0.097 ***0.414  ***-0.162




                     
Table 3. Bank stability, ownership and bank supervision 
 
Dependent variable is Z score, computed over the period 1996-2001, unless otherwise noted. Dependent variable in regression (5) is the volatility of equity returns over the 
period 1999-2001 based on weekly total equity returns. Dependent variable in regression (6) is earnings volatility over the period 1996-2001 calculated as the 5-year period 
average standard deviation of the ratio of total earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions to average total assets. Dependent variable in regression (7) is Z score, computed 
as in Table 4 but over the period 2002-2004.The sample includes the 10 largest listed banks in the country in terms of total assets, if available. Revenue growth is the bank’s 
average growth in total revenues during the last year. CF is the fraction of the bank’s ultimate cash-flow rights held by the large owner (zero if no large owner). We use 10 
percent as the criteria for control. Per capita income is the log of GDP per capita of the country. Rights is an index of anti-director rights for the country. Capital is an index of 
capital regulation. Restrict is an index of activity restrictions. DI denotes whether the country has explicit deposit insurance or not. Enforce is a country index of enforcement of 
contracts. Concentration is the 5-bank concentration ratio in terms of total assets. M&A activity is the percentage of companies listed on the country’s stock exchange that have 
been targeted in completed mergers or acquisitions deals during the 1990s. Size is the log of total assets. Loan loss provision is the ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest 
income. Liquidity is the ratio of the bank’s liquid assets to liquid liabilities. Large owner on mgt board is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a large shareholder has a 
seat on the management board of the company. Managerial ownership equals the total cash-flow rights of senior management. Bank-level data are for the year 2001. 
Regressions are estimated using OLS, except regression (4) which is estimated using instrumental variables. Regression (2) includes country fixed effects. As instrument for CF 
in regression (4) we use the average CF of other banks in the country. In regression (4) we exclude countries with one bank. For regression (4) we also include the p-values of 
the Hausman test of endogeneity and the F-test of excluded instruments. In addition we report the partial R-squared of excluded instruments. The Hausman test is based on 
regressions that do not control for clustering. Standard errors that control for clustering at the country-level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
           Fixed
effects 
  IV Equity
volatility 




Revenue growth  0.063  0.288  0.181  0.330  -0.063  1.555  0.836  0.180  -0.199  -0.199 
  (0.528)                   
             
                   
                   
                  
            
                  
            
              
            
              
              
                
              
                
              
                  
(0.293) (0.527) (0.456) (0.107) (1.190) (0.570) (0.396) (0.337) (0.337)
CF
 
-1.473***  -1.251*** -0.622*  -3.116***   0.239***   1.613* -0.663** -1.021*** -0.946** -0.946**
(0.407) (0.327) (0.391) (1.051) (0.085) (0.851) (0.311) (0.373) (0.417) (0.417)
Per capita income 
 
    0.125**  0.012  -0.052**  -0.185**  0.064  0.118**  0.333  0.333 














(0.036) (0.041)  (0.041)
DI -0.665***  -0.598**
 
  -0.598**













                 (0.006)  (0.006)
Size                
                
                
              
                  
              
                
                  
                
                  
                   
                   
                     
-0.095*  -0.095*
(0.053)  (0.053)








Large owner on mgt board 
 






Hausman test of endogeneity (p-value)  --  --  --  0.001***  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Partial R
2 of excluded instruments  --  --  --  0.174  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
F-test of excluded instruments 
 
--  --  --  0.000***  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Number  of  countries
 
46 46 46 43 42 46 39 40 37 37
Observations 268 268 268 265 198 250 192 235 209 209
R-squared 0.16 0.14 0.19 -- 0.09 0.26 0.09 0.32 0.34 0.34
 




           
Table 4. Interactions between CF and Country Characteristics 
 
Dependent variable is Z score. Revenue growth is the bank’s average growth in total revenues during the last 3 years. CF is the fraction of the bank’s ultimate cash-flow rights 
held by the large owner and zero if there is no large owner. We use 10 percent as the criteria for control. Rights is an index of anti-director rights for the country. Capital is an 
index of capital regulation. Restrict is an index of activity restrictions. DI denotes whether the country has explicit deposit insurance or not. Regressions are estimated using 
OLS with clustering at the country-level. Standard errors that control for clustering at the country-level are reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Revenue  growth            0.267 0.289 0.392 0.162 0.462*
  (0.366)         
     
           
         
   
         
           
         
           
         
     
           
         
        
        
        
       
           
         




CF -2.694*** 1.407** 1.875*  0.673*  2.265**
(0.879) (0.659) (0.976) (0.391) (0.912)
Per capita income 
 
0.159***  0.112*  0.105*  0.103*  0.130** 
(0.052) (0.058) (0.060) (0.056) (0.052)
Rights
 
-0.046  0.066  0.087  0.077  -0.043
(0.070) (0.075) (0.078) (0.081) (0.059)
Capital
 
0.039 0.257** 0.019 0.032 0.193**
(0.070) (0.101) (0.073) (0.075) (0.086)
Restrict
 
-0.119*** -0.129*** -0.036 -0.130*** -0.072*
(0.033) (0.041) (0.043) (0.034) (0.038)
DI -0.660***  -0.732**  -0.635*** -0.208  -0.374*
(0.206) (0.274) (0.223) (0.235) (0.221)
CF * Rights  0.588**        0.524*** 
(0.234)   (0.185)
CF * Capital 
 
  -0.773***      -0.542*** 
(0.214) (0.154)
CF * Restrict 
 
    -0.309***    -0.204*** 
(0.107) (0.073)




Number  of  countries
 
40 40 40 40 40
Observations 235 235 235 235 235






           
Table 5. Bank risk and valuation 
 
Dependent variable is Z score. The sample includes the 10 largest listed banks in the country in terms of total assets, if available. Revenue growth is the bank’s average growth 
in total revenues during the last year. CF is the fraction of the bank’s ultimate cash-flow rights held by the large owner and zero if there is no large owner. We use 10 percent as 
the criteria for control. All bank-level data are for the year 2001. Per capita income is the log of GDP per capita of the country. Rights is an index of anti-director rights for the 
country. Capital is an index of capital regulation. Restrict is an index of activity restrictions. DI denotes whether the country has explicit deposit insurance or not. Tobin’s Q is 
the bank’s Tobin’s Q, calculated as the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of assets. Regressions are estimated using 
instrumental variables with clustering at the country-level. As instruments for Tobin’s Q we use the bank’s market share in total deposits, a dummy variable that indicates 
whether the bank is listed or has an ADR traded on the NYSE, and an index of entry regulation for the country. We report both the first and second stage regression. We also 
include the p-value of the F-test of excluded instruments, the p-value of the overidentification test of excluded instruments, and the partial R-squared of excluded instruments. 
Standard errors that control for clustering at the country-level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Second-stage: Z-score           
Tobin’s Q  -5.004  -1.515  1.944  1.671  0.555 
  (4.179)         
             
         
           
           
         
   
           
   
           
           
         
           
           
     
   
      
            
        
        
(3.549) (3.660) (3.442) (3.286)
Revenue growth
 
0.224 0.210 0.304 0.446 0.535**
(0.553) (0.409) (0.349) (0.282) (0.272)
CF -1.331*** -1.021*** -3.115*** -0.407 2.650**
(0.366) (0.365) (0.964) (0.977) (1.342)
Per capita income 
 
0.174  0.132  0.152  0.125  0.098 
(0.115) (0.103) (0.095) (0.090) (0.093)
Rights 0.190*  0.125  -0.071  -0.084  -0.030
(0.103) (0.106) (0.119) (0.105) (0.096)
Capital   0.033  0.034  0.280**  0.202**
(0.086) (0.081) (0.118) (0.094)
Restrict
 
-0.119*** -0.113*** -0.128*** -0.069*
(0.038) (0.034) (0.038) (0.038)
DI -0.610*** -0.671*** -0.717*** -0.327
(0.216) (0.212) (0.254) (0.218)
CF * Rights      0.751***  0.684*** 
 
0.509** 
    (0.281) (0.244) (0.248)
CF * Capital        -0.813***  -0.557*** 
        (0.198) (0.143)
CF * Restrict 
 
        -0.233*** 
(0.090)
CF * DI -1.386***
(0.412)




        
Revenue  growth
 
           
         
   
           
         
   
           
           
         
           
         
           
           
   
   
      
            
        
             
         
           
           
           
         
        
           
         
           
-0.000 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
CF 0.006  -0.000  0.068**  0.047  -0.064
(0.015) (0.016) (0.032) (0.064) (0.062)
Per capita income 
 
0.010***  0.010**  0.008**  0.008**  0.010*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Rights 0.008**  0.008**  0.013***  0.013***  0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Capital
 
0.004 0.004 0.002 0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Restrict
 
0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DI 0.009 0.009 0.010 -0.011
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
CF * Rights      -0.025**  -0.024*  -0.018 
    (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.011)
CF * Capital        0.006  -0.004 
      (0.011)  (0.010)
CF * Restrict 
 
        0.006 
(0.005)




0.010 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.014
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
NYSE 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.042***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Entry  restrictions
 
0.006 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Partial R
2 of excluded instruments  0.134  0.104  0.082  0.083  0.094 
F-test of excluded instruments  0.000***  0.001***  0.007***  0.007***  0.007*** 
Overidentification  test  (p-value)
   
0.495 0.862 0.821 0.921 0.758
Number  of countries 38 38 38 38 38






   
Appendix 1  Bank risk, Ownership structure, and Regulations by Country 
 




volatility  CF 
Large owner 
on mgt board 
Managerial 
ownership  Rights  Capital  Restrict  DI  # of banks 
Argentina  3.47                    0.56 0.65 0.47 1.00 0.00 4 3 8.75 1 1 
Australia  3.54                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                    
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                   
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
0.23 0.27 0.01 0.00 0.00 4 3 8 0 9
Austria  4.04 0.20 0.05 0.40 0.00 0.00 2 5 5 1 3
Belgium  3.20 0.33 0.18 0.54 0.00 0.00 0 4 9 1 1
Brazil  2.22 0.80 1.55 0.42 0.86 0.11 3 5 10 1 7
Canada  3.80 0.31 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 5 4 7 1 7
Chile  3.18 0.40 0.34 0.24 0.75 0.23 5 3 11 1 4
Colombia  2.67 0.39 1.59 0.32 0.40 0.00 3 n.a. n.a. 1 5
Denmark  3.32 0.19 0.33 0.15 0.00 0.00 2 2 8 1 10
Ecuador  2.89 n.a. 1.52 0.52 1.00 0.17 2 n.a. n.a. 1 5
Egypt  3.14 0.44 0.49 0.19 0.86 0.00 2 3 13 0 7
Finland  2.94 0.34 0.31 0.37 0.33 0.00 3 4 7 1 2
France  3.11 0.28 0.15 0.40 0.00 0.00 3 2 6 1 6
Germany  3.12 0.40 0.18 0.32 0.20 0.00 1 1 5 1 5
Greece  2.60 0.56 1.03 0.33 0.88 0.02 2 3 9 1 8
Hong Kong  3.06 0.43 0.42 0.35 1.00 0.18 5 n.a. n.a. 1 7
India  2.73 0.40 0.42 0.62 1.00 0.00 5 3 10 1 9
Indonesia  0.72 0.82 5.73 0.75 1.00 0.06 2 5 14 1 7
Ireland  3.21 0.37 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 4 1 8 1 6
Israel  3.29 0.85 0.29 0.43 0.38 0.03 3 3 13 0 8
Italy  3.05 0.36 0.28 0.13 0.00 0.00 1 4 10 1 10
Japan  2.00 0.57 0.52 0.26 0.00 0.00 4 4 13 1 5
Jordan  3.16 n.a. 0.51 0.23 0.57 0.13 1 5 11 1 7
Kenya  2.33 0.41 1.63 0.18 0.25 0.02 3 4 10 1 4
Korea, Rep. of  1.61 0.76 1.20 0.26 0.30 0.01 2 3 9 1 10
Malaysia  2.28 0.53 0.54 0.30 0.33 0.11 4 3 10 0 6
Mexico  3.01 0.67 0.60 0.58 1.00 0.58 1 4 12 1 1
Netherlands  3.40 0.32 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.00 2 3 6 1 2
Nigeria  2.51 n.a. 1.54 0.15 0.14 0.01 3 5 9 1 7
Norway  3.43 0.26 0.25 0.05 0.11 0.00 4 n.a. n.a. 1 9
Pakistan  2.46 0.31 0.91 0.50 0.71 0.20 5 n.a. n.a. 0 7
Peru  3.09 0.86 0.87 0.55 0.00 0.06 3 3 8 1 3
Philippines  3.32 0.49 0.81 0.29 0.30 0.21 3 1 7 0 10
Portugal  3.54 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.29 0.22 3 3 9 1 6
Singapore  3.49 0.49 0.31 0.27 0.50 0.27 4 1 8 0 2








volatility  CF 
Large owner 
on mgt board 
Managerial 
ownership  Rights  Capital  Restrict  DI  # of banks 
Spain  3.52                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
0.26 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.00 4 4 7 1 10
Sri Lanka  3.14 0.44 0.41 0.14 0.40 0.00 3 0 7 0 5
Sweden  3.28 0.30 0.28 0.09 0.00 0.02 3 3 9 1 3
Switzerland  3.60 0.30 0.36 0.26 0.00 0.20 2 3 5 1 5
Taiwan  3.32 0.49 0.17 0.23 0.50 0.00 3 2 12 0 10
Thailand  0.46 0.60 1.58 0.52 1.00 0.08 2 4 9 1 7
Turkey  1.64 0.95 3.57 0.53 0.30 0.20 2 1 12 1 10
United Kingdom  3.64 0.40 0.21 0.02 0.00 0.00 5 3 5 1 6
Uruguay  3.14 n.a. 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
USA  2.98 0.42 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.01 5 4 12 1 10
Venezuela  2.80 0.70 1.64 0.32 0.33 0.24 1 3 10 1 3
Zimbabwe  2.77 n.a. 2.08 0.06 0.00 0.00 3 n.a. n.a. 0 1
Total  2.85 0.47 0.86 0.27 0.35 0.06 3.13 3.11 9.23 0.78 287
 